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The  deﬁnition  of  “the  right  targets”  and  the  way  the  evaluation  of  results  is  performed
affect  the  willingness  to commit  to new  challenges,  which  is a factor that  inﬂuences  the
relationship  between  goal  setting  and  performance  results.  Indeed,  some  authors  claim
that  the choice  of  an  inappropriate  goal-setting  procedure  is  a major  cause  of  failure  of
management  control  systems.  Goal  setting  theorists  found  that  assigning  a  speciﬁc  and
challenging  goal  leads  to higher  performance  than  (a)  an  easy  goal,  (b)  a  general  goal  or (c)
no  goal  setting.  Despite  this  evidence,  yet,  few  proposals  concern  the  deﬁnition  of  what  is
“challenging”.  This  paper  focuses  on  two  issues:  (a)  what  is to  be  considered  a challenging
goal  and  (b) what is  a “fair evaluation”  in the  health  care  sector.  This  work  suggests  that
benchmarking  is  a  valid  support  to  solve  the  previous  dilemmas.  Relying  on  two  Regional
European  advanced  experiences  –  Valencia  in Spain  and  Tuscany  in Italy  –, this  paper  aims
to  provide  conceptual  methods  that  can  help  managers  deﬁne  challenging  goals  and  con-
duct fair  evaluation  about  their  achievement.  Although  these  Regions  adopted  different
governance  models,  both  of  them  applied  very  similar  techniques,  which  seem  to be asso-
ciated  to  an  improvement  of  their  performance  and a reduction  of  unwarranted  variation.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
1. Introduction
Goals have pervasive inﬂuence on employees’ behav-
ior and in turn on organizational performance. This basic
assumption of goal setting theory – developed by Locke
and Latham at the end of the 80s for the individual level –,
has been analyzed for the organization and system levels
by control management scholars. Literature and experience
∗ Corresponding author at: Laboratorio Management e Sanità, Istituto
di Management, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa. Piazza Martiri della
Libertà,33. 56127 Pisa.
E-mail address: m.vainieri@sssup.it (M.  Vainieri).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.09.011
0168-8510/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).D  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
on goal setting showed that assigning targets is not sufﬁ-
cient. For instance, the experience of Health for all program,
launched by the WHO  in mid-80s [1], that set targets to
member states and renewed them in the mid-1990s with
the Health21 policy framework [2], ﬂawed in some coun-
tries and in some areas [3]. Scholars that analyzed this case
[4] stated that some strategies were not met  because of:
the lack of involvement of key actors at the grass-roots lev-
els; the shift of power and responsibilities from the central
to the regional level [5]; the lack of the “right targets” in
terms of prioritization, reﬂecting the speciﬁcity of coun-
tries and in terms of identiﬁcation of the correct effort to be
required. All these elements are also found in general litera-
ture on performance management [6]. Indeed, the adoption
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
h Policy 
o
a
[
g
h
g
r
d
h
g
o
l
m
d
t
i
[
t
g
t
t
c
e
c
t
r
o
d
t
i
i
s
g
d
T
e
t
(
a
T
o
d
a
i
a
e
w
t
cM. Vainieri et al. / Healt
f an inappropriate goal-setting procedure is deemed to be
 major cause of failure of management control systems
7].
Scholars of goal-setting theory stated that effective
oals should be assigned considering the content (what
ave to be sought) and the intensity (how to attain the
oal) [8]. Regarding the health care sector, both central and
egional levels use targets in their governance models in
ifferent ways, getting different results [9–11].
At this purpose, Brown et al. believe that successful
ealth care systems have: a public, speciﬁc statement of
oals with a plan for reaching these goals; a public report
f improvement results and strong physician and clinical
eadership in improvement efforts, aligned to improve-
ent goals (again, supported by useful data) [12].
In this scenario, control management studies mainly
iscussed which indicators should be selected, the criteria
o choose them [13–16] and some elements of the process,
n particular the importance of feedback and involvement
6,17,18]. When goal is speciﬁc and challenging, it leads
o higher performance than (a) an easy goal, (b) a general
oal or an exhortation to “do one’s best,” or (c) no goal set-
ing [8,19–24]. Yet, few evidence and proposals concern
he deﬁnition of what is “challenging”, that is an important
haracteristic goals should have to motivate workers [25].
The deﬁnition of “the right targets” and the way  the
valuation of results is performed affect the willingness to
ommit to new challenges, which is a factor that inﬂuences
he relationship between goal setting and performance
esults [25]. Seeking to respond to the aforementioned two
pen issues, it is possible to identify at least four sub-
ecisions managers and policy makers need to take when
hey set and evaluate targets:
i. Whether to deﬁne the benchmark the actors are aiming
at;
ii. Whether to set homogeneous targets for all the actors;
ii. Whether to consider the agents’ past and relative per-
formances to set targets;
v. Whether to adjust results on the basis of environmental
factors.
Goal setting procedure needs to consider whether a gold
tandard or a normative target exist (i). When neither the
old standard, nor the normative standard exists, then the
eﬁnition of the targets often require a subjective decision.
his situation can jeopardize the legitimation of goals. Nev-
rtheless once the standard is deﬁned, policy-makers have
o decide whether to assign the same target to all units
i.e., health authorities, health departments or profession-
ls) (ii). Homogeneous goals are often assigned to all units.
his decision encounters some drawbacks. The ﬁrst one
ccurs when the goal is set, for every unit, to the gold stan-
ard. The gold standard requires extreme effort for some
gents so that it can be perceived as unattainable. Seem-
ngly impossible goals can have two opposite effects known
s “the paradox of stretch goals”. Stretch goals could inﬂu-
nce organizational learning and performance in a positive
ay by facilitating improvement because they are seduc-
ive, but they can also have a disruptive effect leading to no
ommitment at all [25,26].120 (2016) 1270–1278 1271
The second drawback is what managerial literature
deﬁnes the “threshold effect”. This occurs when a min-
imal and equal threshold is set for all the controlled
actors. On the one side, this mechanism puts some inten-
tional pressure on under-performing agents; on the other
side, it instills a perverse incentive for all those agents
who are already performing over the threshold, by stim-
ulating a regression toward the threshold level [27]. The
threshold mechanism generally penalizes those actors that
perform well but still have single criticalities, while it
favors mediocre agents, who systematically perform in the
threshold range. To overcome these problems, individual
goals can be preferred.
When policy-makers have to set individual goals or they
do not have the gold standard, a way to set targets is con-
sidering the past and relative performance of agents (iii).
Indeed, previous studies demonstrate that goals have to be
set considering the difference between the units and their
starting point (baseline) [6,28]. Performance incentives had
the greatest impact on providers whose performance was
lower at baseline [29] so that policy-makers could ask more
to the worst-performers, considering that the effort should
be perceived as challenging but attainable. Indeed, disrup-
tive effects seem to be more frequent in those organizations
whose recent performance was low [26].
In laboratory experiments (largely applied in the goal
setting theory) challenging goals are usually considered to
be those that are ﬁxed at the 90th percentile of the orig-
inal distribution, while in ﬁeld experiments “challenging”
is what agents perceive as “difﬁcult yet attainable” goals
[25]. That implies that the deﬁnition of what is challenging
is set, most of the time, on subjective basis.
Finally, the evaluation of the level of target attainment
by each agent (iv) can correspond to the simple degree of
achievement of the set targets, but other factors need to be
considered. In particular, some contextual variables might
have affected the degree of achievement itself. This means
that some correctives have to be envisaged [6,8,30].
This paper supports the thesis that the introduction
of some benchmarking techniques might be the solution
to face the four above-mentioned issues. Indeed, bench-
marking techniques have been applied in the public sector
since the 1990s [28], becoming the basis for the develop-
ment of management control systems as dominant form
of governance in the health care sector [9–11]. The follow-
ing paragraphs report the conceptual framework drawn by
two European experiences – Valencia in Spain and Tuscany
in Italy –, that suggest how benchmarking techniques can
be leveraged to set appropriate targets and conduct fair
evaluation of their achievement.
2. Methodology
The paper offers a comparison of the methods two
regional institutions – Tuscany (Italy) and Valencia (Spain)
– independently developed to set appropriate targets to
their health care units and to assess their attainment. The
study is the result of a longitudinal action research pro-
cess. The action research approach is a research method
that aims to simultaneously solve ‘real’ problems in social
systems and contribute to the basic knowledge of social
h Policy 1272 M. Vainieri et al. / Healt
science. The distinctive stronghold of action research is that
the researchers are involved along the ﬂow of life of the case
organization, in close collaboration with its members. This
has good potential for producing both practically relevant
and theoretically interesting contributions [31–35].
The ﬁrst output of action research is an idea for change
or a design of a solution to the problems faced by the
host organization, both of these typically jointly developed
with the members of the organization. In practice, this
usually means the researcher’s participation in a project
team in charge of taking care of a change project [36].
Action research also includes the testing of the ideas for
change, typically by teaming up with the members of the
host organization and by supporting the implementation
of new solutions. Hence, organizational change (or at least
an attempt to accomplish that) is an important output of
this kind of study designs. This close collaboration enables
the collection of research material that cannot be usually
retrieved by other approaches [31].
The authors of this paper directly cooperate with the
regional public agencies that set targets for the health care
authorities (for Tuscany) and for the health care profession-
als (for Valencia). In both cases, the spiral action research
process suggested by Berg [37] were applied. Researchers
participated in the periodical meetings organized by the
institutional bodies in charge of the deﬁnition and evalu-
ation of the health care units goals; those meetings were
summarized in internal reports and in regional public acts,
while single meetings and exchanges were recorded in
researchers’ notes.
With reference to the Tuscany case, Laboratorio MES  of
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa) has been actively collab-
orating with the regional health care administration since
2004. In particular, researchers have been cooperating with
the health care regional department in deﬁning a method
to set appropriate goals to the regional health authorities,
quarterly monitoring the targeted indicators and in helping
evaluate the goals’ achievement.
Regarding Valencia Region, data collection was made
possible by the direct involvement of one of the authors in
the daily activity of the Agencia Valenciana de Salud (AVS)
as Chief Information Ofﬁcer.
Thanks to their direct involvement, the authors have
been able to collect ﬁrst hand research material about the
procedures the two institutions adopted to set challenging
goals, to observe the application of the proposed method
and to intervene along the process from the targets def-
inition to the assessment phase. Quali-quantitative data
are therefore the main output of the long-time collabora-
tion between the authors and the Tuscany Region/Agencia
Valenciana de Salud. In particular, the analyzed period
for Tuscany goes from 2007 to date while for Valencia
the period runs from 2007 to 2011. Data and informa-
tion drawn from action research are complemented by
regional public acts and regional internal reports for Tus-
cany; regional strategic plans and internal reports for
Valencia.The epistemological limitations of action research have
been thoroughly investigated [38]. We  acknowledge that a
two case comparison lacking a formalized procedure to col-
lect and interpret data may  raise some relevant concerns120 (2016) 1270–1278
about internal and external validity. Nonetheless, the topic
this paper inquires remains largely unexplored and we
believe that our study can make an important contribution
both in terms of scientiﬁc novelty and policy implications.
3. The technical framework for setting targets and
assessing performance
Before investigating the speciﬁc experiences of the two
case studies, we describe the technical framework those
experiences need to be contextualized in. The two  case
studies actually share the same methodology to set chal-
lenging goals and assess their achievement. The process
is jointly based on systematic comparison (benchmarking)
and on information on past performance.
The method follows a reasonable heuristic rather than
statistical methods (such as data envelopment analysis). In
order to ease the process and to streamline the commu-
nication toward stakeholders. The method can be divided
in two  phases: (1) setting goals and (2) assessing perfor-
mances.
For both phases, regional policy makers and managers
have to identify the appropriate key performance measures
(as suggested for instance by Ref. [15]), representing the
goal and the group of peer units (units with similar mission,
such as teaching hospitals or focused hospitals).
The essential ingredients of the method are two: (1) past
performance measures which represent the baselines for
improvement; (2) the relative performance. The method
works with goals expressed in quantitative terms. Indica-
tors should be easily measurable with an explicit and clear
formula.
Considering the target setting phase, literature shows
that targets have to be set on the basis of previous or actual
results (the baseline), by asking for an inverse effort related
to the goal standard or the best performers: [6,28,39] the
greater improvement is required to the units with the
poorer performance, whilst a less challenging improve-
ment to those that already registered a good performance.
This can be done by executing, for each indicator, the
following steps: (1) ordering the comparable units on the
basis of their baseline (past or actual performance); (2) set-
ting the targets of two  units; (3) drawing the line between
the two  targets; (4) calculating the expected values on the
basis of the line; (5) proposing the targets to the general
managers of the units, to ﬁne-tune the target, according to
local peculiarities.
Step 2 is a crucial phase. The two cases we studied con-
sider two  options: (a) setting the targets of the best and
the worst performers or (b) setting the targets of the worst
performers and the median value.
A-option is used when there is a gold standard that the
best performer must achieve or there is the intention to
ask the best performer for holding its position. B-option is
adopted when there is no gold standard.
For the A-option, the gold standard (derived from liter-
ature or national/regional plans, such as the vaccination
coverage) can be used as a reference for the best per-
former(s). It is possible to ask the worst performer to
improve up to the 25th percentile (or to decrease to the
75th percentile, if the lower the value the better). In this
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Fig. 1. The reference points, for indicator
ay, it is required to the worst performer to behave as the
/4 of the units registering a performance lower than the
edian, as showed in Fig. 1.
If there is no gold standard, then the B-option is pre-
erred. In this case, the two expected values are set to
he worst and the median values. In particular, the unit
eporting the worst value is assigned a target such as in the
-option: to increase up the 25th percentile or to decrease
o the 75th percentile (if the lower the value the better).
egarding the second expected value, the Region (or the
entral government) could think to shift the median to the
5th percentile (or to the 25th percentile for indicators
hose value is expected to decrease), as reported in Fig. 1.
Once the two expected targets are set, two dots have
een identiﬁed: for increasing indicator, the actual perfor-
ance of the best practice and the gold standard (or the
ctual median and the 25th percentile) is one of the dots,
hile the other dot is the actual performance of the worst
ractice and the 36.5th percentile. The expected values of
he other units can be inferred using the linear equation
hat results from the connection of the two dots.
In the B-option, it is possible that the expected value
or the best performer(s), coming from the equation, tends
o worsen the performance, instead of improving it. In this
ase, the A-option is to be preferred, by asking the best
erformer(s) to hold the value.
Step 2 determines the range of variability that the
egion may  consider as acceptable. Indeed, it could sound
dd to accept a certain degree of unwarranted variation.
he underpinning of this choice is linked to the empirical
vidence provided by the goal setting theory that chal-
enging goals lead to better performance. Although it is
esirable that all units achieve the performance of the best
ractice or the gold standard, assigning to every unit, for
he same goal, the same expected target may  be perceived
s unfair, thus reducing motivation to achieve it. Indeed,
ncremental goals can be more motivating than radicalave to increase (the higher is the better).
changes, which can be perceived as stretch goals. Hence,
the assumption is that anchoring the target deﬁnition to
ex-ante performance would lead to better results and faster
reduction of geographical variation (see for instance Ref.
[40]).
Goal achievement evaluation is the last crucial pro-
cess to be performed. If the set target is reached, then the
achievement is 100% and no further evaluation has to be
done.
If the set target is partially attained, then, in order to give
a fair evaluation, it is important to compare performance
with the other comparable units and the baseline. Indeed,
the relative performance and the baseline can help under-
stand if the target was  stretch or if environmental factors
occurred.
How to assess in a fair way target partially attained? It
depends upon circumstances. It is possible to identify ﬁve
scenarios:
1. The performance of the unit worsened as well as all the
other comparable units: it is clear that some external
factors occurred, so that the set target would no more
be attainable or the selected indicator would be uncon-
trollable by the units;
2. The performance of the unit worsened and the relative
performance is lower than the median. In this case, per-
formance evaluation is deﬁnitely negative;
3. The performance of the unit worsened but the relative
performance is higher than the median. In this case, the
evaluation is not so negative and an incentive could be
given according to its relative position;
4. The performance of the unit improved, but it did not
achieve the set target and the relative performance is
lower than the median;
5. The performance of the unit improved and the relative
performance is higher than the median.
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In the fourth and ﬁfth scenarios, it is possible to apply
the linear system suggested by Locke [41]: the percentage
of the obtained improvement could be credited to the unit.
In addition, for the ﬁfth case, policy makers may  acknowl-
edge a bonus for the relative performance. In this case, they
have to choose: the threshold for providing the bonus (the
mean? The median? Another percentile up to the median?
The best performance?), and the bonus share between the
relative performance and the degree of improvement.
4. The two  regional cases
The Spanish Health System’s universal coverage is
funded by taxes and it predominantly operates within the
public sector. The devolution process to the Regions ended
up in 2002 even if started before for some Regions [42].
Indeed, Valencia Region has had fully autonomous power
in managing and organizing its health care since 1987. The
Agencia Valenciana de Salud (AVS) is the public body that
provides health care services to approximately 5 million
inhabitants, through 24 Local Health Departments.
Since 2004, AVS has adopted a management control sys-
tem based on targets and their evaluation. Since 2005, this
system has also been aligned with the variable salary of all
its employees and, since 2007, it has been linked to their
professional career (decree 38/2007).
Objectives are declined starting from three domains:
responsiveness, health care service provision and ﬁnancial
sustainability.
When goal-setting was ﬁrst applied, most of the objec-
tives referred to process indicators (such as average length
of stay) then, in 2010, outcome and quality indicators were
introduced too.
Every year, regional managers selected the indicators
to be included in the reward system, on the basis of the
strategic plan, the contextual environment and the list of
indicators used at the national level to assess Regions.
The decree 38/2007 of the Department of Health reports
the basic principles and actors involved in the deﬁnition
of the variable pay of professionals (see yearly plans from
2007 to 2012, and the periodic strategic regional plans).
Results and other information about algorithms can be
derived from internal AVS reports and other Spanish doc-
uments [43]. Appendix A shows the last goals available.
In 2013, the law no. 7181/2013 determined the closure of
the AVS. Its functions and personnel were transferred to
the Department of Health, that still monitors and assesses
health units and professionals. With this change, in 2013,
the new regional management decided to go backward
to the traditional goal-setting procedures. The technique
described in this paper is still used to manage private health
care institutions. However, it seems that the Department
of Health is currently reconsidering the application of the
method for public institutions too.
The Italian health care system ensures universal cov-
erage and, after the devolution process of the 90s, each
Region is responsible for organizing and delivering health
services [44–47]. Tuscany’s health care system covers
approximately 3.7 million inhabitants, delivers 95% of its
services through its publicly-owned organizations, and120 (2016) 1270–1278
spends more than 6.6 billion euros in health care services
per year.
In 2005, Tuscany’s health care system adopted a Per-
formance Evaluation System (PES) that consists of more
than 100 quantitative indicators, publicly disclosed [48]. In
2006, the region administration decided to link the PES to
the Chief Executive Ofﬁcers’ (CEOs) reward system. Before
2006, most of the CEO goals were qualitative and assessed
following the “all or none” criterion. They were mainly
based (more than 50%) on ﬁnancial performance and the
average achievement level reached up to 90%, with low
variability. After integration with the PES, more than 50% of
the goals became quantitative and the weight of the ﬁnan-
cial assessment goals was reduced [49]. Above mentioned
information can be found in the Regional acts that assign
the goals to the health care authorities CEOs and internal
documents and reports.
Every year, regional managers select the indicators that
are included in the reward system, on the basis of the
strategic plan and the regional priorities [16], the con-
textual environment and the list of indicators used at the
national level to assess Italian Regions. Since the introduc-
tion of the National outcome program [50], some indicators
have been relating to the health care outcomes too (such
as 30 days mortality rate for AMI). Appendix A shows the
list of performance goals of the last year available.
Both Valencia and Tuscany apply similar goal-setting
methods, although some differences persist.
To sum up, it is possible to group the main differences
in two aspects: (1) the process of communication and (2)
the level of implementation. As regards the communication,
Tuscany publicly discloses all the information – in order
to leverage the professionals’ reputation –, while Valencia
carefully selects some information to be publicly dissem-
inated and some other information to be communicated
only to peers. Concerning the level of implementation, Tus-
cany assigns health care goals to the health care authorities
(formally represented by their CEOs), whilst Valencia has
a centralized and pervasive system, which sets targets and
assesses them not only at the macro level (health depart-
ments), but also at the micro level (professionals).
Moreover, there are differences in the technical meth-
ods the two  Regions adopted. For the target-setting phase,
Tuscany uses a global performance goal and an overall
improvement goal, with the aim to motivate health author-
ities to pay attention to all the indicators, in order to reduce
potential output distortions [9,51]. Regarding the assess-
ment phase, Valencia uses the median (Tuscany adopted
the mean), the arctangent function to adjust for the past
performance effect and the premium for best performers
(Tuscany accepts a small variation to hold the same posi-
tion). In particular, the three components that are applied
to the evaluation phase are those of Section 2 [43]: (1)
the degree of achievement of the set target (linear com-
ponent); (2) the performance improvement or worsening
(asymptotic component) and (3) the relative performance,
compared to similar Local Health Departments’ one (expo-
nential component). The performance improvement is
corrected by a factor ranging from 0.5 and 1.5 from an arc-
tangent function, with the aim of reducing or increasing
the value of the objective by 50%, depending on whether
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Fig. 2. The yearly percentage of performance improvement and reduction of variation in Tuscany and in Valencia.
Fig. 3. Standardised hospitalization rate in Tuscany; DTP vaccination coverage in Valencia.
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 deterioration or an improvement occurs. An additional
nd ﬁnal correction is applied in the Valencian method to
nsure that there is always someone that achieves 100%
f the target: if p is the percentage of achievement of the
est performer and this value is less than 100, a correction
actor of 100/p is applied to rescale all the other scores.
Results obtained by the two Regions seem rather
ncouraging. On the one side, the proposed method
equires some effort and stimulates technical competences
y the Region/supporting bodies; on the other side, it eases
he communication process between evaluators and eval-
ated. Since this technique was applied, the claims about
oal unfairness (both from the worse and from the best
erforming units) has heavily reduced.
Both in Valencia and in Tuscany, this technical frame-
ork helped make the mechanism of ﬁnancial incentives
or CEOs (Tuscany) or employees (Valencia) credible and
cceptable. It led not only to continuous improvementgth of stay.
but also to strategy alignment between the Region and
the Health Departments. Finally, most of the indicators
reported a reduction of variability in the performance
of the units analyzed [48,52]. The following descriptive
statistics can offer some insights about the implications
of the adoption of a coherent managerial strategy (that
includes the goal-setting process proposed in this paper)
on performance and variation: the percentage of improved
indicators has varied across years between 54% and 67% in
Tuscany; 54% and 64% in Valencia (see Fig. 2). In addition,
more than 50% of indicators reduced their variability every
year.
The list of indicators of the last year available are
reported in Appendix A, while some examples are shown
below. In particular, Fig. 3 reports the results obtained by
the 12 Tuscan Local Health Authorities in the standard-
ized hospitalization rate from 2008 to 2014 and results
obtained by the 24 centers that have to monitor whether
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0–6 months babies have completed all the requested exams
in outpatient primary care visits (2008–2010). For the Tus-
can case, the normative standard for hospitalization rate
was 120 × 1000 residents (DGRT 1235/2012), while for the
Valencian case (DTP vaccination coverage) the gold stan-
dard is 100% (Fig. 3).
As Fig. 4 shows the Tuscan Local Health Authorities have
steadily reduced their hospitalization, while the reduction
of variation is unstable, because of the different speed in
improving performance; however, in the long run, every
LHA is aligning to the best performers, as 2013 results
show. In the three years analyzed for Valencia (2008–2010),
the majority of units improved, reducing differences across
them.
Fig. 4 reports another example, for indicators that do not
have a standard: the average length of stay. It is calculated
differently by Valencia and Tuscany: Valencia considers the
average DRG weight of the hospital, while Tuscany consid-
ers the average number of days above or below the regional
average length of stay (per DRG).
In the Tuscan case, the average length of stay has
reduced on average of one day: the 16 units (12 Local
Health Authorities and the 4 teaching hospitals) moved
from a 2008 median of up 1.5 days to less than 0 in 2015.
The reduction of variation in this case is more evident. In
the Valencian case, the average length of stay reduced of
0.3 days on average from 2006 to 2010. In this case, the
reduction of variability is less evident.
5. Discussions and conclusions
The two cases this paper describes aim to help solve
the dilemma of “how challenging is challenging” and
“how to conduct a fair assessment of the target achieve-
ment”. The methodologies adopted by the two Regions
share at least two components: performance benchmark-
ing (relative performance) and performance baseline (past
performance). They both integrate a cross-sectional per-
spective (benchmarking) with a longitudinal one (past
performance).
On the one side, benchmarking introduces a yardstick
competition among the actors of the health systems, by
helping Regions set difﬁcult, yet attainable targets and
avoid problems linked to uncertainty.
On the other side, following the assumption that incre-
mental goals can be more motivating than radical changes,
the technical framework (Section 3) proposes to set tar-
gets by asking for an inverse effort on the basis of past
performance. The expected consequence is a high degree
of success, which leads to an overall regional improvement
and a reduction of geographic variation as well.
The results obtained by the two Regions seem promis-
ing, as both of them register performance improvement
and variability reduction. The process we described is
aimed not only at guaranteeing high-quality services
(deﬁned by the chosen targets), but also at reducing the
distance between best and worst performers: it is there-
fore designed to support Regions in coping with potential
inequalities in services.
Moreover, reports of the Ministry of Health on the per-
formance of the Italian Regions to guarantee essential level120 (2016) 1270–1278
of care from 2007 to 2014 highlight that Tuscany steadily
improved its performance results (compared to the other
Italian Regions) becoming the best performing Region in
2013 and in 2014, also registering the highest level of
improvement.
Results obtained by the two Regions (both in terms
of performance and in terms of variability) might have
signiﬁcant implications, if we consider that Tuscany and
Valencia have adopted very different governance models. If
we take up Bevan and Wilson’s classiﬁcation [11], Valencia
can be deﬁned to have adopted the centrally driven “hier-
archy and targets” model, with some characteristics that
are linked to the “choice and competition” model. Actu-
ally, the public-private partnership that was introduced
into the system enables quasi-market mechanisms. Tus-
cany, instead, combines the “hierarchy and targets” model
with public ranking [9]. Despite different governance mod-
els, the technical solutions adopted by the two Regions are
very similar. Both of them use past performance and rel-
ative performance to set challenging goals and to fairly
assess their achievement. Hence, the operational frame-
work seems to be useful and adaptable to different contexts
and seems to be applicable to different levels (CEOs, heads
of departments, individuals).
The two  case studies we described differ in a relevant
characteristic, that might deserve some further consid-
eration: as mentioned above, the goal setting procedure
is addressed to the CEOs of Local Health Authorities
and Teaching Hospitals in Tuscany, while it focuses on
the health departments and on professionals in Valencia.
Hence, the method is mainly proposed at the macro level
to regional administrations, but it can also be applied at the
micro level, as long as units can be compared and there is a
shared performance measurement system already in use.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to inquire whether
the application of the goal setting techniques we  discussed
prove to be differently effective according to the differ-
ent agents it is addressed to (CEOs, heads of departments,
professionals). They are only a part of the Tuscan and Valen-
cian managerial strategies and further research is needed
to understand if (and how much of) the positive afore-
mentioned preliminary results can be attributed to the
methods applied in the two Regions. However, we  want
to emphasize that the underlying assumptions that some
of the recommendations this paper infers – the importance
of considering the baseline in the goal-setting procedure,
for instance – can be generalized across the different lev-
els. Moreover, the preliminary evidence of the effectiveness
of this method are inﬂuenced also by the application of
broader governance tools.
We  deem it necessary to dedicate some conclusive
remarks to the reorganization that affected the AVS in
2013. This speciﬁc event gives us the opportunity to high-
light the need of systematically combining the scientiﬁc
accuracy of the management tools with their transparent
disclosure: allegedly, the main reason behind the choice
of dismissing the goal-setting procedure described in the
paper and to opt for a simpler one was  the need to adopt
a methodology that could be easily understood by the
new management of the department of health, that took
in charge the deﬁnition of goals and its assessment in
h Policy 
2
t
t
(
b
m
l
s
t
e
(
u
f
s
r
h
“
a
p
g
a
c
A
a
t
b
m
A
c
h
R
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[M. Vainieri et al. / Healt
013. The policy-makers mainly embraced transparency
o leverage the professionals’ and the managers’ reputa-
ion in improving performances, but it also could have a
positive) side-effect: once granted, transparency cannot
e easily withdrawn. This means that it anchors the policy-
akers themselves to an irrevocable public accountability
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Indeed, public disclosure of data contributes to fully
xploit the opportunities a performance evaluation tool
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